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Introduction: The Strategic Perspective  
Secure energy supply is an essential for industrial societies. Recognizing the very criticality of this 
condition tends to get caught between alarmism and complacency. Even more, “there is a 
tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable . . . The danger is in a 
poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than 
likely.”  
It was one of the most influential nuclear strategists, Tom Schelling, who observed this in his 
introduction to the Roberta Wohlstetter classic on the Pearl Harbor attack. And lessons for this 
conference’s main theme can indeed be drawn from the Pearl Harbor experience—both from 
Japan’s fear to get strangulated through energy cut-offs and from the strategic surprise to the 
United States, even though the United States had all the needed intelligence somewhere. What 
was missing was a strategic posture that allowed it to integrate discomforting data into a picture 
commensurate with the emerging threat. However, history is not rich with cases where the victim 
of attack was prepared to respond without the jeopardizing effects of surprise: Barbarossa, 
Hitler’s attack on France, the Cuban missile crisis, and more recently, 9/11, are all repeats of the 
Pearl Harbor experience.  
In retrospect, it is astonishing that throughout the Cold War (except for repeated quarrels over 
Iran as took place in 1951, 1973 and 1979), secure energy supply hardly ever has become a 
primary issue. The dual control of suppression of local and regional crisis potentials in areas like 
the Gulf, and of access of the global competitors to respective claimed energy resources, 
prevented the perennial competition from seriously becoming intermingled with energy supply. In 
fact, Soviet supplies to contested Germany increased well before the end of the Cold War.  
There were two main reasons for that. One was the increasingly stabilizing nuclear deterrence 
regime that had emerged from the post-war disorder after 1945, and which enabled a successful 
transition from the most threatening strategic environment in history to a process of peaceful 
change. The other was the functioning of global economic institutions reinforced by a demand-
driven energy supply system—at least for oil—i.e., OPEC.  
Like after 1945, a thorough reordering of global power structures is now in the making. In fact, the 
transition after 1989/90 was still under way when Saddam Hussein was reaching out to the oil 
riches in the Upper Gulf in an attempt to change profoundly the relations between the 
industrialized and the developing world. However, after 1945 the concept of “One World” was 
replaced by a nearly global division of power and influence that lasted for roughly four decades. 
The concept of a new “global order” that was meant to become the organizing concept for the 
post-Cold War world, rapidly lost its original meaning amidst the turmoil of various concurrent 
developments.  
Global energy supply is both profoundly affected by this state of international disorder and is itself 
a driving factor in exacerbating international competitiveness. For decades the United States was 
a born guarantor of secure energy supply among the industrialized nations regulated through 
customer-oriented international institutions which helped establishing a global market for oil that 
also helped regulating the supply of gas. In recent years we have gone through a major reversal 
of this basic situation:  
• The United States has become heavily dependent on energy imports.  
• There no longer is a customer-oriented market mechanism.  
• Major powers compete for long-term secure energy supplies.  
• The industrial countries no longer share a common approach.  
• They also need to compete with the BRIC states (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India and China) or 
else are susceptible to manipulations on the part of major producers.  
• Countries like the GCC states, on top Saudi Arabia, which feel insecure capitalize on the 
U.S. interest to protect them while also cooperating on energy strategy and other delicate 
issues with U.S. opponents.  
Secure energy supply has become a secular problem on the international agenda. However, 
policy debates are so far primarily focused on resources, demands and energy mixes that can 
serve to meet the demands. In addition, the implications for climate change are increasingly 
recognized. No global or regional approaches have been developed, let alone agreed upon 
towards the economic and security dimensions of the overall energy future than can be 
envisaged at this stage. In fact, energy security is still widely considered as a national prerogative.  
This article will address energy security in global perspective. In varying degrees disruptive 
actions like piracy, terrorism, insurgency and coercive diplomacy get attention—after the event. 
These are serious challenges that deserve more analysis, investments and efforts. In key 
countries like the United States and, more modestly, within the GCC states and the European 
Union programs have been initiated to mitigate these risks and uncertainties. However, these 
challenges need to be addressed within a much broader context. The challenges change their 
criticality, depending on:  
• the vulnerabilities of the supply chain and the requirements for complex disruptive actions,  
• the changing trading patterns for oil and gas and their respective strategic implications,  
• the geopolitical risks, i.e. both adverse geopolitical changes and actual or potential state 
level conflicts with a critical energy dimension.  
Changing trade patterns and strategic environments require scenario-based approaches with 
mid- to long-term perspectives. After all, Shell introduced scenario-based analysis and planning 
after the 1973 oil shock. Today the global oil market is disintegrating and long-term energy supply 
strategies mostly follow current political preferences with respective dependencies (like the 
German Russian-first policy). Reorientations tend to be difficult, if only in view of expensive 
infrastructures. The dominant strategies are thus shaped by regional circumstances and short- to 
mid-term expectations.  
In search of a conceptual framework in pursuit of future energy security three interrelated levels 
need to be distinguished:  
• Vulnerabilities of the oil and gas supply from drilling to refining  
• Changing trade patterns for oil and gas  
• Changing strategic/geopolitical environments for oil and gas supply.  
Vulnerability of Existing Oil and Gas Supply Systems to intended 
Disruptions  
Within given global and regional supply structures and below the level of military conflict, supply 
chains are increasingly threatened by terrorism, insurgency, piracy, and sabotage along with 
neglect, incompetence, etc. Terrorist and insurgent attacks on oil and gas supply facilities are in 
the current focus of attention.  
All segments of oil and gas supply systems from oil wells to the pumping stations and the entire 
pipeline network and sea transport lanes to terminals, tanks, and refineries can be targeted and 
need to be protected. Global and competitive demands, transportation, and their strategic 
implications have rendered energy security a global security requirement.  
However, in assessing these risks it is important to make two distinctions:  
• Vulnerability tends to be understood in terms of its technical susceptibility and 
weaknesses. This condition can be mitigated to a degree, but never eliminated. Given 
that, it is important to understand why there have not been more and more varied 
catastrophes so far. One factor is increasing protection, but that often can be bypassed. 
More importantly, attacks and in particular larger-scale attacks are guided by targeting 
policies and strategic objectives. In this perspective vulnerability needs to be understood 
in terms of intended consequences, in particular cascading and secondary effects with 
political impact. This vulnerability would not work without technical vulnerabilities, but the 
likelihood of major attacks, the selection of targets and the chances for disruptive 
damage come with the political rationale for the attacks.  
• Below the level of military conflict rather different types of attack are possible and do 
happen: sabotage, piracy, incidental terrorism, insurgency, terrorist campaigns, and 
strategic terrorism that aim at major enduring and strategic changes.  
Producer states without economic diversification tend to be more vulnerable than states with 
increasing economic diversification, even if there political conditions are relatively stable. 
Reserves and substitutions would help to match drastic cut-offs of exports in a major producer 
state.  
For industrial countries in North America, Europe, and Asia the long-range transport through 
pipelines or shipments is the most endangered segment:  
• 40 mio. barrels of oil are daily at sea.  
• Within up to 15 years this tends to go up to 70 mio. barrels.  
• LNG shipments are likely to triple over the next ten years or so.  
• Today 25 percent of the global oil requirement flow daily through the Strait of Hormuz 
(with its two 3 km-wide channels), i.e., 88 percent of the oil exported from the Gulf. 
According to the IEA, 16 to 17 mio. barrels exit daily through these narrow channels. 20 
to 30 tankers cross the Strait every day, at times one every six minutes.  
• There exist plans to bypass the Hormuz bottleneck by trans-Arabic pipeline systems. But 
already today 40 percent of oil globally flows through long pipelines, and avoiding the 
Hormuz risks may increase the exposure of the vulnerable pipeline network.  
• Obviously other choke-points, on top the Strait of Malacca, add to this very serious 
vulnerability of the oil and gas transportation system.  
Producing countries like Russia as well as major customers seek to avoid critical dependencies 
through the choice of routes, e.g., through reliable transit states, to render competing routes less 
attractive or to bypass critical choke-points. Recent examples have received political attention. 
The critical issue will increasingly be whether usable flexibility can be designed so as to reduce 
the overall vulnerabilities of the supply system.  
The expanding system does offer increasing redundancy and thus flexibility and to an extent 
resilience. In fact, resilience is likely to ensure sustainability unless other coercive measures, i.e., 
military attacks, come into play.  
The case of Iraq is special in that it is a war-torn country, and political objectives of terrorism are 
clearly defined in regard to allied occupation. However, even after a withdrawal, sectarian and 
tribal conflicts as well as renewed quarrels over the distribution of oil revenues among the Iraqi 
factions may continue.  
In Iraq as the most exposed country the oil sector remained relatively safe until mid-2003: neither 
during the Iran-Iraq War nor the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Desert Storm did the Iraqi oil sector 
suffer from attacks and sabotage. From mid-2003 to early 2007, the Iraqi oil sector has suffered 
more than 400 attacks—at times one attack a day. More than 280 attacks were directed against 
oil and gas pipelines to both disable and to prevent repair. While oil and gas pipelines are the 
most vulnerable part of the supply chains, the attacks hit almost every segment of the Iraqi oil 
industry infrastructure.  
In less disabled producer countries—Saudi Arabia is a case in point—damage and political 
impacts can still be considerable. The same is true for customer countries. But resilience is likely 
to ensure sustainability unless other coercive measures, i.p., military attacks, come into play. 
However, while both World War II as well as allied bombing campaigns in Iraq and former 
Yugoslavia suggest that even in view of secondary and cascading effects, major terrorist 
campaigns can hurt severely, they are far from likely to bring down a fairly developed political 
structure. The economic jihad is a challenge with serious potential consequences, but by itself it 
is not going to jeopardize global structures. It could, however, exacerbate global competitions 
over energy security. However, while terrorism is unlikely to lead to military conflicts between 
global competitors, competitions over securing energy possibly could.  
The Strategic Impact of Changing Trading Patterns for Oil and Gas  
More than anything, nationalization and dominant state control of reserves, investments, 
infrastructures, prices and supplies have dramatically changed traditional trading patterns:  
• 80 to 85 percent of oil, and 60 to 70 percent of gas, reserves are controlled by state 
governments or state-controlled enterprises.  
• The oil market is increasingly driven by suppliers rather than customers.  
• A large portion comes from states which operate outside OECD- and WTO-rules.  
• The global oil market is no longer governed by market mechanisms, i.p. for these 
reasons:  
o concentration in the Middle East (i.p. Saudi Arabia);  
o OPEC countries have discovered their coercive potential;  
o investment policies by producing and reserve states are increasingly driven by 
national assertive, if not aggressive, interests and policies.  
o No integrated gas market exists, and between the three major supply areas there 
is little overlap: Europe (from RF and Algeria), East Asia and United States 
(primarily from Canada).  
o Forthcoming tripling of LNG and expected Northeastern passages will change 
this pattern in the direction of increasing interregional and intercontinental supply.  
o So may the emergence of partly intercontinental producer coalitions for both oil 
and gas, i.p.:  
 The SOC, i.e., the so-called Shanghai Organization for Cooperation, with 
Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and, as 
an observer, Iran which is designed to move the United States out of 
Central Asia (Caspian Sea), and which is now turning into a military 
organization (first joint maneuver “Peace Mission” in August 2007 with 
6,500 soldiers including 1,500 Chinese, plus fighter aircraft and 
helicopters).  
 The Gas-OPEC with Russia, Iran and Algeria as potential founding 
members. It is still facing reluctance on the part of Qatar and the need for 
developing Iranian gas fields (depending on U.S. relaxation and foreign 
investments, only 20 percent so far developed).  
 The “Bolivarian Group”, i.e., the Venezuela-initiated coalition in Latin 
America including Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, with growing links to 
Argentina and Mexico and close ties to Iran, Russia (Russia supplies 
armaments to Venezuela), and China.  
 SOC aims at reducing U.S. leverage, whereas the Gas-OPEC would 
generate a massive non-cooperative, if not aggressive, Russia-led 
potential vis-à-vis Europe and the Bolivarian Group in challenging the 
United States on the continent (even with some military back-up), even 
though Venezuela is still primarily selling to the United States.  
• This is mirror-imaging established U.S. strategic policies, but while the United States 
tends to reduce dependencies on energy imports and still has to draw the lessons from 
Iraq, the new formations are dominated by anti-U.S. and anti-Western countries with an 
expansive, if not aggressive, drive.  
• Other nations envisage similar constructs, e.g. the “arc of nations from the Gulf to East 
Asia” suggested by India with an appeal to the UAE states.  
• Mutual dependencies between some producers and customers are often considered as a 
stabilizer (a preferred German argument in view of Russia), but these trading relations 
are asymmetric and hardly constrain the producing state in a highly competitive or hostile 
situation.  
Some producing countries, i.p., the UAE states, are creating second-order dependencies through 
strategic investment policies which can both ensure protective interests of third parties and 
reduce the coercive power of non-cooperative customer states.  
• Bilateralism in energy diplomacy is rapidly becoming a critically important tool in order to 
secure long-term supply commitments (e.g., China vis-à-vis Kazakhstan, the GCC states 
Iran, Sudan, Nigeria et al.), to escape U.S. restraints (e.g. Iran vis-à-vis Saudi-Arabia, 
Venezuela, et al.) or to balance dominant U.S. influence (e.g. Saudi-Arabia and other 
GCC states vis-à-vis India, China, even Iran, et al.)  
• There still exist contested assumed or confirmed resources, e.g., the Barents Sea 
(Russia/Norway), the northern polar region (Russia, United States, Canada, Denmark), 
the Aegean (Greece/Turkey), etc., that could invite open conflicts.  
All in all a new type of hostile trade between major producers and customers is unfolding which 
may work, but under delicate and possibly worsening conditions.  
• Some major energy producers thus engage in balancing games (e.g. Saudi-Arabia), 
challenging games (e.g. Venezuela), or power games (Russia).  
Reliance on flexibility in supplies thus increases, but with diminishing steering power. This basic 
uncertainty is exacerbated by the chances that political conditions for secure oil and gas supply 
can change at short notices. The shock of 1979 is a vivid case in point. The evolving fabric of oil 
and gas trading with its increasingly competitive, if not hostile, characteristics tends accelerate 
these geopolitical developments.  
The ever widening gap between demands and supplies is reinforcing the ongoing competitions 
over energy without prospects for structural solutions before options like possibly fusion 
technology begin to work.  
Even without violence and conflict, unfavorable geopolitical changes in the global structures for oil 
and gas supply can change both the secure supply and regional, if not global, power structures. 
As a result, an increasing number of players is opting for niche strategies which renders 
coordination of supply even more cumbersome.  
Changing Political-Strategic Environments for Energy Security  
The bottom-up approach for new energy trading patterns needs to be supplemented by a top-
down approach for new power structures:  
• Current and future global players;  
• Major suppliers of oil and/or gas without own protection and likely to be drawn into global 
power struggles;  
• Additional suppliers of oil and/or gas and critical transit states;  
• Formations/alignments of suppliers of oil and/or gas that share some commitments 
towards global powers, be it as antagonist or protector; and,  
• Networks with commitments to violence and with or without back-ups by states with 
military potential.  
This complex structure of oil and gas supplies needs indeed to be understood within the changing 
global framework of evolving power structures: Competitions over future oil and gas supplies are 
shaped by profound changes of power structures and are themselves a major, if not the most 
pivotal, determining driver in this evolution, the outcome of which is certainly hard to predict. In 
fact, in case confrontational policies and postures tend to dominate this evolution, it is most likely 
to be the result of competitions over oil and gas supplies.  
The bipolar deterrence system ended with the end of the Cold War, and it has not been replaced 
by an effective security mechanism. In fact, control of nuclear weapons has itself become more 
delicate in view of:  
• The shaky situation of nuclear-armed Pakistan;  
• An increasingly cornered and self-isolated Israel;  
• Acceptance of the Indian nuclear weapon-state status;  
• An uncertain North-Korean predicament within a competitive East Asian ensemble of 
actual and potential nuclear weapons-states;  
• The Iranian nuclear gamble,;  
• The beginning reverberations in kind among the GCC states; and,  
• An increasingly unrestrained Russian military policy (even though at present primarily 
aiming at enhancing domestic stability).  
In this vein, the U.S. posture is characterized by  
• Incoherent efforts to restore effective control over nuclear weapons in the emerging new 
strategic environment;  
• A highly assertive use of military power; and,  
• Considerable uncertainty over future leverage and political backing of military power in 
critical areas, i.p., the Gulf, Africa, the Caspian Sea, the critical choke-points, and not 
least importantly within the South American hemisphere where U.S. dependence on oil 
imports combines with straight-forwardly aggressive policies toward the United States, 
above all on the part of Venezuela.  
Most importantly, the shared strategic interest on the part of the main antagonists—the United 
States and the USSR—has receded, to say the least.  
Today’s evolving power struggle is over economic power, influence, and resources; and control 
over energy supplies is a central element of this competition, however increasingly backed up by 
competing military capabilities. Given the incentives and potentials for conflict, it is a relevant 
hypothesis for policy planners that competition over energy supplies will lead to major, if not 
global, conflicts with critical military dimensions, even if none of the global players is committed to 
such a course of events.  
To develop a framework for relating the evolving trading patterns and the evolving power 
structures, it is suggested to supplement a bottom-up approach for new energy trading patterns 
by a top-down approach for new power structures:  
• Current and future global players;  
• Major suppliers of oil and/or gas without own protection and likely to be drawn into global 
power struggles;  
• Additional suppliers of oil and/or gas and critical transit states;  
• Formations/alignments of suppliers of oil and/or gas that share some commitments 
towards global powers, be it as antagonist or protector; and,  
• Networks with commitments to violence and with or without back-ups by states with 
military potential.  
Changes in the global and regional supply systems are almost certain to come eventually. The 
risks involved differ from level to level. It is important not to distinguish these four levels:  
• Vulnerabilities of the supply chain: They offer disruptive opportunities to hostile actors 
along with the risks of insufficient infrastructures, mismanagement, and mishaps. 
Strategic consequences will require complex attack preparations.  
• Terrorist and piracy incidents: Can have considerable impact as part of larger campaigns, 
but mostly in terms of local disruption plus political attention.  
• Non-state campaigns like economic jihad which aim at major systemic disruption.  
• Geopolitical risks, i.e., actual or potential state level conflicts with a critical energy 
dimension.  
Changing geo-strategic environments for energy supply are most importantly affected by 
changing power relations between global players:  
• The United States is massively dependent on oil and gas imports, but is seeking to 
reduce this dependence and to increase its share of friendly imports (Canada).  
• It is experiencing the limited applicability of dominant military power and even its 
counterproductive political effects.  
• It seeks to exercise maximum control of global oil and gas resources in the Gulf region 
(protection of Arab and restrictions on Iranian resources), in the Caspian region (though 
with increasing opposition from regional players as well as Russia and China), along the 
Indian Ocean (see the Malabar 07-02 naval exercise with the United States, Japan, 
Australia, India and Singapore in the Gulf of Bengal that may turn into a military alliance 
to control sea-lanes to East Asia and could become a counterpart to the SOC), in Africa 
(new AFRICOM), and in Latin America.  
• Except for Canada and Norway, no unambiguous strategic consensus exists between the 
United States and major producers. Instead, increasing diversification of protective 
interests and commitments and increasing challenges to U.S. control with trends towards 
new anti-American alignments (including trans-continental coalitions) are unfolding.  
• Russia is openly seeking to use its sole-source leverage to re-establish itself as a global 
power. However, its military potential could at the best neutralize or complicate U.S. 
military protective operations.  
• Russia’s increasing assertive political and military posture is backed by its gas and oil 
exports. Its global aspirations are currently aiming at strengthening domestic coherence 
and stability, but they could again develop into a global power game. However, Russia so 
far fails to translate its energy-gains into economic and social development at home, and 
its political access to external oil and gas richness is limited even in the Caspian regions, 
even though projects like the Gas OPEC and armament support to Venezuela display at 
least traditional Russian efforts towards power projection.  
• The most likely victim of more aggressive Russian energy export strategies would be 
Europe, and unlike during the Cold War, the United States is much less likely to be able 
or even willing to protect Europe against such contingencies.  
• China is a very different case: While Russia seeks to regain power, China has re-entered 
the global scene. It is more assertive and less constrained in its dealing with suppliers. 
Unlike Russia it also has a long-term political strategy which is backed by an increasingly 
strong economic base and, more slowly, by military power to back-up its energy-oriented 
global policies, although the steep increase in energy demand poses problems which 
China still seeks to reconcile with long-term objectives. It seeks supporting networks to 
secure energy supplies (in Africa, the Caspian region, cautiously even in the Gulf region). 
However, unlike Russia, its dependence on energy imports exists and tends to increase. 
And for a long time to come its dependence on oil and gas imports will be threatened by 
unmatchable U.S. military power along the Indian Ocean lines and beyond.  
• New alignments that could serve to reduce U.S. leverage like the SOC are therefore 
acquiring an increasing importance, the envisaged pipeline from Iran and long-term deals 
with U.S. allies like Saudi Arabia at least help to diversify their dependence on the United 
States.  
• India, Japan, Europe and Brazil deserve special comments that are outside this 
presentation.  
During the Cold War the United States and the USSR were locked into a stalemate and could not 
be seriously challenged by third parties. Their strategic and political relationship could only be 
changed by political changes in critical regions were both global powers were directly committed. 
It happened to be above all Central Europe and Germany. Energy was not an issue. When the 
European division was ended, the United States turned temporarily into an unchallenged sole 
global player.  
In today’s evolving constellation of global players energy, above all oil and gas, became a key 
driver: 
• Power relations between global players will not primarily be determined by direct force 
relations, and economic competitiveness is too complex to allow measurements of 
respective global power.  
• The most likely changes in global power relations would result from changes in how 
major supplier states develop and line up with global players. E.g., if GCC states undergo 
profound political changes like in Iran it would provide them with both own leverage and 
the option to influence—however undesirable—the strategic relations between global 
players.  
• This is a mid- to long-term problem, but the likelihood that political structures within the 
strategic ellipse between the Barents Sea and the Indian Ocean will by and large stay as 
they are is extremely low.  
• This pertains above all to the Gulf and the Caspian region, and all of the global players, 
on top China and Russia, and of the regional supplier states are fully aware.  
Changing relations between global players and major regional suppliers can have secular 
implications:  
• They could result from strategic policies of global players, e.g., an eventual U.S.-Iranian 
rapprochement or an increasing Chinese penetration of the Gulf and Africa.  
• They could also result from internal changes within major supplier states like the GCC 
states, on top Saudi Arabia.  
• Any such change will affect vital interests of the respective losers. No mechanism does 
exist yet that could serve to mitigate such strategic conflicts, and prospects for continued 
changes could instead exacerbate such contests.  
• This is even more precarious if global players anticipate such a conflict and increasingly 
prepare for it. However, global players will be very reluctant to engage in direct military 
confrontations. Their relations can be critically affected by changes on the part of major 
supplier states and their role in global competitions.  
• Since none of the supplier states (with the exception of Russia) is self-sustained and all 
need protection, coalitions of suppliers, transit states, and client-oriented networks like al-
Qaeda become ever more important (after all al-Qaeda developed in response to first a 
Russian, and then above all, a U.S. military presence).  
• For the time being, no mechanism for mitigation exists. Changes within and among major 
suppliers will be driven also by factors (e.g., sectarian) that are beyond the reach of 
global players. But given the criticality of oil and gas suppliers, the escalatory potential is 
there. Horizontal escalations are plausible in view of other (including smaller) suppliers, 
transit states, regional players like Egypt, and last, but not least, terrorist networks like al-
Qaeda.  
For a long time to come this seems to be the only kind of scenario for a new globalization of 
conflicts, albeit it could easily combine with additional critical drivers like changing control of 
nuclear weapons (e.g., in Pakistan). Susceptibility to terrorism and similar threats like piracy, 
sabotage, etc., can intensify such trends, because these are likely to fall in line with such 
changing power relations.  
Judging the global players in terms of dependencies, competitiveness, alignments, and military 
readiness it is obvious that all players are beset with strategic problems that limit their global 
reach and control of energy resources:  
• The United States can improve its national position over time, but at the expense of its 
protection of allies and with decreasing applicability of military power.  
• Russia can continue to consolidate its power base backed by its oil and gas resources, 
but tends to fail as a global economic power and to acquire military leverage to fill the 
gaps. It is unlikely to penetrate oil- and gas-rich regions outside Russia except for 
possible major strategic mistakes of global competitors, in particular the United States 
(e.g., in view of Iran).  
• China will become more competitive along with increasing dependence on energy 
imports. While China is currently searching for appropriate strategies, it will in the longer 
run be more successful than Russia (and probably at the expense of the United States) in 
establishing favorable energy-oriented alignments. Its will also acquire considerably more 
economic leverage than Russia vis-à-vis the West. Its military strategic outreach will 
systematically increase, but will continue to fail balancing U.S. power projection 
capabilities to secure supplies (except for drastic changes in U.S. global strategic 
policies).  
The United States is not without constructive options like an eventual rapprochement with Iran, 
but short of that it will increasingly tend to fight an up-hill fight. Vast increases in monetary state 
reserves provide China, Russia and the GCC states with a new kind of leverage the economic 
and strategic criticality of which is still discomfortingly uncertain. Given that the United States is 
exceptionally indebted to China and the GCC states, the United States faces potentially vital 
threats to the foundation of its global power position, whereas shifting financial markets in favor of 
the Euro or eventually Islamic banking tend to put Europe and others more into the forefront: The 
United States may face a mix of energy, monetary, economic and strategic challenges.  
Contested energy supply will be the main driver, although in the absence of counter-veiling 
policies the other trends may increasingly take on a life of their own—with each presenting 
challenges Europe is far from having the policies, means and alignments to cope with.  
China, Russia, India, and to a degree the United States pursue long-term comprehensive policies 
to mitigate the challenges to secure energy supply, to which Europe will need to respond. Like 
Japan, Europe is only beginning to envisage strategic energy futures and its options are limited—
not least importantly because the leading European powers have widely different energy policies 
as well as strategic policies. It is far from recognizing the complex structure of future energy 
security in terms of:  
• Vulnerabilities of the existing oil and gas supply system to intended disruptions;  
• Changing trading patterns and their strategic implications; and,  
• The changing political-strategic global and regional environments for energy security.  
Vulnerabilities can be reduced, but not eliminated. Terrorists and the like always have chances to 
find vulnerable points, although preparatory action can raise the thresholds for such activities.  
Major hostile campaigns require more complex strategic planning and execution, but in instable 
political environments their chances and likelihood will increase (e.g., the presence of al -Qaeda 
in the back of Algeria and Morocco could turn into a serious predicament).  
Geopolitical risks are the most difficult risks to integrate into a framework for secure energy 
supply. From European perspectives this is more difficult still because Europe has not so far 
developed a strategic perspective. Its vulnerability to terrorism is increasingly recognized even 
though remedies are still far from adequate. Its susceptibility to changing trading patterns and 
even more to changing geostrategic environments is serious and tends to grow although so far 
Europe is only marginally involved in critical conflict areas.  
If current trends within the European Union continue, energy supply with its economic, strategic, 
and political implications will soon become the most divisive issue in European affairs, even if a 
sectoral EU energy policy will emerge and begin to downplay currently dominant national 
approaches. On the other hand, increasing political recognition of the full complexity of the 
challenges future energy supply is posing to Europe may offer a chance to turn future energy 
supply into the organizing concept for the European Union. However, the EU partners would need 
to define their strategic objectives within a global framework, and with a shared understanding 
that failure to pursue an increasingly common strategy will leave no member unhurt.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe."  
 
